

Chapter 4

The Argument That Froze Physics

Two physicists can agree about an experimental result and disagree about what it means. That was at the heart of the argument between Einstein and Bohr. Quantum calculations worked remarkably well. The dispute concerned what sort of world could produce the results they predicted.

Einstein wanted more than probabilities for what an observer would find. Bohr argued that we could not discuss quantum properties without considering how they were measured. Both raised difficult questions. Their disagreement was about what counts as an explanation, as well as about the place of chance in nature.

Physics did not literally freeze. It advanced enormously while this disagreement remained. The chapter title refers to the unresolved question beneath that progress. How do the possibilities in a quantum calculation relate to the particular events we record? Many practical discoveries could proceed without an agreed answer.

I return to the argument because both concerns matter to PDT. I want to understand a world that exists whether or not we look at it. But looking involves equipment that interacts with that world. An explanation must take the equipment seriously too.

Was the description complete

If a theory predicts everything we can currently measure, does it follow that it tells us everything physically relevant? Its success gives us good reason to trust the predictions. It does not, by itself, rule out a deeper explanation of why those predictions work.

Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen challenged the completeness of quantum theory in 1935. They considered systems that had interacted and then moved apart. Measuring one could let us predict something about the other. They argued that this raised a problem for the quantum description. [1] Later work placed severe limits on their assumptions. But the question of completeness remains worth asking. An event in a distant star does not wait for us to learn about it before it happens.

I share that expectation. A probability tells us what to expect when we look. I also want to understand the physical situation to which it refers. An answer might improve our understanding even if it gave us no better way to predict the next result.

That does not mean the deeper picture must resemble everyday machinery. Relationships between quantum systems may be unlike those between separate familiar objects. Seeking an understandable explanation is different from insisting that nature work in the way we find easiest to imagine.

As an engineer, it is tempting to picture a hidden mechanism made of smaller moving parts. That can be useful, but it can also mislead. What I take from Einstein is the question about completeness. I do not take it as a promise that particles must be miniature machines.

Why the apparatus matters

Bohr asked us to consider the experiment as a whole. What we can say about a quantum property depends on how the system is prepared and measured. His reply to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen developed this point through complementarity, the idea that different experimental arrangements reveal aspects that cannot all be displayed together in one arrangement. [3]

An instrument is not a window that leaves everything untouched. It makes particular interactions happen. Equipment designed to show interference works differently from equipment designed to distinguish paths. Those differences affect what can be recorded. They matter physically, before we begin arguing about what the records mean.

This fits part of my thinking about PDT. If relationships matter, then the relationship between a particle and its detector belongs in the explanation. Removing the detector from our mental picture can remove something essential about the event we are trying to understand.

My further question is whether the changing phase relationships in the whole experiment could explain how its result forms. Bohr stressed what the arrangement allows us to say. PDT asks whether its physical involvement can also help explain why a particular event occurs.

A detector makes this concrete. Build and prepare it one way and it can distinguish one feature. Prepare it differently and it makes a different comparison. The result belongs to that encounter. It need not reveal an answer that was already complete inside the incoming object before anything happened.

For me, this brings the two concerns closer together. We can ask for an explanation of a real world while recognising that our instruments are part of it. The conditions under which we observe are themselves physical conditions. Perhaps following them more closely will help explain the result.

How possibilities might narrow

Was the result fixed in advance, or did chance choose it? Before answering, I want to examine the encounter. As it develops, the conditions change. PDT asks whether some ways it could proceed become impossible because the arrangement can no longer support them.

Imagine a narrowing set of options. Figure 4.1 starts with four, labelled A, B, C and D. Each is given a burden, a number representing how demanding it is to maintain. In this invented model, an option is ruled out when its burden crosses a limit. The diagram lets us follow the idea step by step.




Figure 4.1 A crosses the chosen limit first, then B and D. C stays below it. The right panel counts the options still available. This is an invented example of narrowing possibilities under a stated rule. The curves and limit illustrate the idea. They are not an established law of nature.

Removing A does not settle the event, because three options remain. Removing B still leaves two. Only after D is excluded does C stand alone. PDT's realisation principle then says that this unique surviving possibility becomes actual. The example places the proposed change within a developing interaction.

To use this in a real experiment, we would need to say what burden means physically, how it changes and what sets the limit. We also need the additional principle connecting one survivor to an actual event. Limited capacity alone does not prove that every encounter will end with exactly one option.

This suggests a possibility worth exploring. An incoming particle need not carry an independent answer to every measurement we might choose. The result could take shape through its encounter with the apparatus. That would give us a physical process to investigate, even if we could not predict each result ourselves.

The preparation would contribute something important, and so would the later experiment. Preparing a system can establish relationships that affect what follows. The apparatus then brings new interactions into play. An explanation would need to follow both, rather than assign the entire result to either one in isolation.

Would complete knowledge of that process determine the result? The model's physical rules would have to answer that. If they did, our limited knowledge might still leave us using probabilities. The drawing does not establish this conclusion. It shows the sort of mechanism we would need to understand before making that claim.

The restriction Bell discovered

Bell turned part of this debate into a mathematical test. Suppose separated systems respond only to local conditions and shared information from their past, with measurement settings independent of that information. Then their results can agree only within certain limits. Quantum mechanics

predicts correlations beyond those limits. [2] A deeper explanation cannot simply restore separate local answer sheets and expect to recover quantum results.

Calling a theory relational does not get around this restriction. PDT still has to produce the right correlations. Figure 4.2 shows the contrast between the local limit and the quantum prediction. It also shows why strong correlations do not let us send an instant message.




Figure 4.2 The left panel uses a correlation score called CHSH. The Bell local limit is two. The illustrated quantum predictions can reach $2\sqrt{2}$. Yet each observer's individual result still has a chance of one half, regardless of the distant setting. The extra agreement appears when records are compared, not as a message in either record alone.

Imagine two experimenters comparing their lists of results. Together, the lists can reveal a striking pattern. But neither experimenter can choose the other's next entry. Without that control, the pattern cannot be used to send an instant message. Correlation and communication are different things.

PDT must explain both features. Each detector leaves a local record. Comparing the records reveals the joint pattern. Whatever relationship the theory proposes must reproduce that pattern without giving either experimenter control over the distant outcome.

This makes separation less straightforward than it first appears. Systems can be far apart and still require a joint description because of how they were prepared. We can describe each instrument locally, but describing the two in isolation can leave out information needed to predict their combined results.

For PDT, this raises a question about what belongs to an object alone and what belongs to its relationships. We can identify two distinct things without assuming that every physically relevant feature is separately contained in each. Some information may belong to how they are connected.

Bell therefore sharpens the search. A hidden mechanism is not enough merely because we can picture one. We must ask whether it falls within a class that cannot give the observed quantum pattern. Some familiar explanations are ruled out, and the remaining possibilities may feel much less familiar.

What would count as progress

Work since Einstein and Bohr has made genuine progress. Decoherence helps explain how interactions with the surroundings make records stable and familiar in appearance. [4] It brings more of the experiment into the physical account, even though it does not alone establish one overall outcome.

We should keep the two questions clear. Why does a record last? Why was this particular record the one that occurred? A future theory might connect the answers. For now, answering the first does not remove the second.

I do not expect the world beneath quantum theory to be easy to draw. But I do want to follow the reasoning. Which interaction makes a difference? How does it make that difference? Why do the results have the pattern we observe? Clear answers matter more than a familiar picture.

Our starting assumptions influence which answers we consider. If we treat a system's quantum state as the whole physical story, the unresolved outcome becomes a problem within that description. We might then change the dynamics, add physical information or interpret outcomes differently. Another possibility is to reconsider what the state describes.

PDT follows that last question. Perhaps a state describes relationships whose ability to continue depends on something deeper. An event could then arise as the interaction rules out possibilities, with the realisation principle supplying the final step. The state would remain useful, but would no longer be the beginning of the explanation.

This does not settle the old argument. It gives me a direction to pursue. I want to combine the demand for a real physical world with the recognition that the whole experiment matters. Then I want to ask how that experiment comes to leave one definite result.

Bridge to Chapter 5

The next chapter examines the starting point itself. Should we begin with objects and then add their relationships? Or could lasting relationships help explain why objects exist? The word primitive simply means what a theory takes as its starting ingredient. Chapter 5 asks whether we have chosen that ingredient wisely.

References and further reading

[1] Einstein, A., Podolsky, B., and Rosen, N. (1935). Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete? *Physical Review*, 47, 777–780. <https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.47.777>

[2] Bell, J. S. (1964). On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen paradox. *Physics Physique Fizika*, 1, 195–200. <https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysicsPhysiqueFizika.1.195>

[3] Bohr, N. (1935). Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete? *Physical Review*, 48, 696–702. <https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.48.696>

[4] Zurek, W. H. (2003). Decoherence, einselection, and the quantum origins of the classical. *Reviews of Modern Physics*, 75, 715–775. <https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.75.715>